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Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Vitalita¨t und Stabilita¨t der Demokratie - auch der Wirtschaft -
ha¨ngen letztlich eminent von der Durchla¨ssigkeit der Gesellschaft ab.
(Horst Ko¨hler, Bundespra¨sident, 29.12.2007)
In dieser Studie wird die Frage der Durchla¨ssigkeit der Gesellschaft, die nach An-
sicht des Bundespra¨sidenten (siehe Eingangszitat) eine wichtige Grundlage der Vi-
talita¨t und Stabilita¨t der Demokratie ist, empirisch mit repra¨sentativen Daten von
Arbeitnehmern untersucht. Aus o¨konomischer Sicht spiegelt sich die Chancengleich-
heit in einer Gesellschaft unter anderem im Zugang zur Bildung, in der Partizipa-
tion am Erwerbsleben und der Ho¨he des Arbeitsverdienstes wieder. Wir suchen in
der vorliegenden Studie Antworten auf die Frage, ob und in welchem Umfang der
o¨konomische Erfolg am Arbeitsmarkt von der familia¨ren Herkunft abha¨ngig ist.
Datengrundlage sind die monatlichen (realen) Arbeitsverdienste von Va¨tern und
ihren So¨hnen aus dem Sozio-o¨konomischen Panel, SOEP, 1984 - 2006. Um die in-
tergenerationale Persistenz der Arbeitsverdienste zu scha¨tzen, haben wir eine inno-
vative Stichprobenstrategie entwickelt, die es erlaubt, Vater-Sohn Paare in einem
vergleichbaren Abschnitt im Lebenszyklus zu beobachten. Dieser ist so gewa¨hlt,
dass die Arbeitsverdienste ein Indikator des Lebenseinkommens sind.
Nach den Ergebnissen unserer mikroo¨konometrischen Scha¨tzungen geht ein Anstieg
des va¨terlichen Arbeitsverdienstes um 10 Prozent mit einer entsprechenden Verbesser-
ung des Sohnes um 3,33 Prozent einher. Am Mittelwert unserer Stichprobe der
So¨hne berechnet (1.937€), entspricht dies einem um monatlich 63€ ho¨heren Ar-
beitsverdienst.
In der Summe deutet die Analyse darauf hin, dass die intergenerationale Persistenz
der Arbeitsverdienste in Deutschland (etwas) ho¨her ist als bisher vermutet. Dennoch
weisen die Scha¨tzungen auf eine vergleichsweise hohe intergenerationale Mobilita¨t
bezogen auf den Arbeitsmarkt in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten hin.
Non-Technical Summary
The vitality and stability of our democracy - as well as the economy -
eventually depend on the social permeability of our society.
(Horst Ko¨hler, German Federal President, 29.12.2007, own translation)
This statement draws attention to the strong meritocratic believes concerning the
equality of opportunity that govern public debates. This is especially true for the
education system. But, does this general concern translate into a society in which
one’s economic success in the labor market is independent of the family born into?
And if so, to what degree?
In this study, we investigate intergenerational persistence among German workers.
Our measure of labor market success is real monthly earnings before taxes and
social security payments. The relationship between fathers’ and sons’ labor market
earnings is assessed with samples drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP) 1984-2006. We introduce a novel sampling procedure that allows us to
observe father-son pairs at a rather similar stage of their lifecycle.
From a variety of microeconometric estimates (utilizing both OLS and IV meth-
ods) we suggest that the best point estimate of intergenerational earnings persistence
among German workers is one-third. Hence, if in the period of investigation a fa-
ther’s permanent labor market earnings increased by 10 percent, the son’s long-run
economic status grew by 3.33 percent. Evaluated at the mean of our sample of sons
(1,937€), this implies a step up of 63€ for the son.
This number indicates a lower degree of mobility (and a higher degree of persis-
tence) in Germany in contrast to preceding studies. In an international perspective,
the intergenerational earnings persistence in Germany seems to be lower compared
to the United States and higher compared to Sweden. To summarize: there still
seems to be substantial intergenerational earnings mobility among German workers,
but more persistence than previous research suggested.
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In this study we assess the relationship between father and son earnings
among (West) German Workers. To reduce the lifecycle and attenuation
bias a novel sampling procedure is developed and applied to the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1984-2006. Our preferred point estimate
indicates that about 13 of the earnings differential in the labor market
has been passed on from the generation of fathers to their sons.
Keywords: Intergenerational Mobility, Lifecycle, Permanent Earnings, Wages
JEL-Classification: J62, J31, J21
Acknowledgements: We thank the Leibniz Association for financial support from the research
network “Noncognitive Skills: Acquisition and Economic Consequences“. Furthermore Friedhelm
Pfeiffer acknowledges financial support from the German Research Foundation under grants PF
331/2-4 (“Microeconometric Methods to Assess Heterogeneous Returns to Education“). For helpful
discussions we thank Johannes Gernandt, Maresa Sprietsma, Thorsten Vogel, participants of the
7th meeting of the DFG Workshop “Flexibility in Heterogeneous Labour Markets“ on the 4th of
October 2007 in Nuremberg, and our colleagues at the ZEW. We thank Alina Botezat and Moritz
Meyer for their fine research assistance. All remaining errors are our own.
∗Centre for European Economic Research and Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences,
University of Mannheim. Corresponding author: peisenha@rumms.uni-mannheim.de.
†Centre for European Economic Research and University of Mannheim
1. Introduction and Motivation
The vitality and stability of our democracy - as well as the economy -
eventually depend on the social permeability of our society1.
This statement draws attention to the strong meritocratic believes concerning the
equality of opportunity that govern public debates. This is especially true for the
education system. According to public rhetoric it is aimed to guarantee social mobil-
ity in Germany. Families receive a child benefit transfer, schooling for up to 13 years
is free of charge and, if education is continued at a university, the cost of living is
covered by federal aid for students from low-income families. But, does this general
concern translate into a society in which one’s economic success is independent of
the family born into? And if so, to what degree?
To empirically analyze the intergenerational relationship, the following economet-
ric model
yi1 = α+ βyy
i
0 + 
i
1(1)
is used as a starting point (Corak 2004). A linear relationship between long-run
economic status (yi0,1) of family i in generation 0 and 1 is assumed, allowing for
shifts in mean economic status independent of parental status via the parameter α.
Deviations from predicted status due to market luck or other random elements in
the intergenerational transmission of skills and personal traits are summarized in the
idiosyncratic error term i1. Ideally, permanent earnings are chosen as the measure
of economic status (Friedman 1957). We use both terms to describe the long-run
economic success of an individual. In the case all status variables are measured
in their natural logarithm, βy in equation (1) is the intergenerational elasticity of
permanent earnings. It measures the (expected) percentage change in offspring’s
economic status associated with a one percent change in parental success. A pos-
itive value does indicate generational persistence of permanent earnings in which
higher parental long-run status favors economic success of one’s offspring; a nega-
tive number indicates generational reversal of economic status. A value of zero for
the intergenerational elasticity βy (child’s and parental economic success are uncorre-
1Horst Ko¨hler, German Federal President, in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 29.12.2007, Berlin (own translation).
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lated) corresponds to complete intergenerational mobility, while a value of unity (the
child’s economic success is completely determined by parental achievement) is asso-
ciated with complete immobility. (1−βy) provides a measure of the degree to which
economic status regresses to the mean (Becker & Tomes 1986, Goldberger 1989). If
it takes value one (βy = 0), a child from parents who attain below average long-run
status can expect average status just as the offspring of high-status parents.
Although there is agreement about the existence of an intergenerational link in
economic status, a number of recent studies debate its varying magnitude across
countries (Solon 2002, Grawe 2006, Ja¨ntti, Røed, Naylor, Bjo¨rklund, Bratsberg,
Raaum, O¨sterbacka & Erikson 2006). While many features of the human skill for-
mation process are universal, there may however be unique features in German
data. In an international perspective, low tuition fees and federal student aid might
ease the impact of borrowing constraints and thus enhance mobility in Germany
compared to other countries (Mulligan 1997).
The contribution of our paper to the literature on intergenerational persistence is
twofold. First, recent improvements in the understanding of the association between
short- and long-run economic status allow for a new assessment of potential biases
in previous studies. Deviations of current from permanent economic status arise due
to transitory fluctuations (Bowles 1972, Solon 1992) and a time-varying association
between the two (Haider & Solon 2006, Grawe 2006). We introduce a novel sampling
procedure that accounts for both and allows to observe father-son pairs at a rather
similar stage of their lifecycle. Second, the relationship is assessed for Germany with
samples drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1984-2006.
Our results suggest that the best point estimate of intergenerational earnings per-
sistence among West German workers is 13 . This indicates a lower degree of mobility
(and a higher degree of persistence) in Germany compared to Couch & Dunn (1997)
and Wiegand (1997) but is in line with Vogel (2007), who compares intergenerational
mobility between Germany and the United States. In an international perspective,
the intergenerational earnings persistence seems to be lower compared to the United
States βUSy = 0.4 (Solon 1992), and higher compared to Sweden β
S
y = 0.2 (Bjo¨rklund
& Ja¨ntti 1997). There still seems to be substantial intergenerational earnings mo-
bility among West German workers, but more persistence than previous research
suggested.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an introduc-
tion to the econometric methods applied to estimate intergenerational persistence
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with incomplete data. Section 3 presents our novel sampling procedure with the
SOEP. Section 4 discusses the econometric findings, whereas Section 5 concludes.
2. Econometric Problems and Findings from the Literature
In this section the econometric problems associated with measuring intergenerational
persistence and the consequences we draw regarding its estimation among German
workers are pointed out.
2.1. Measurement Error Problems
The deduction of an individual’s permanent earnings requires a life-long earnings
history. Since researchers usually lack direct measures of long-run status yi0,1 for two
generations in order to investigate intergenerational mobility, they rely on proxies
(yi0h, y
i
1t) of permanent earnings for each generation (0, 1) observed at age h and t.
Sometimes only single-year measures of earnings2 have been used. Usually, however,
a short-run measure of economic status is an imperfect proxy of long-run status. It
is subject to measurement error due to transitory fluctuations and lifecycle variation
in the association between current and lifetime earnings3.
2.1.1. Transitory Fluctuations
Current earnings of fathers yi0h and sons y
i
1t can be decomposed as follows (Friedman
1957).
yi1t = y
i
1 + υ
i
1t(2)
yi0h = y
i
0 + υ
i
0h(3)
yi0,1 describe time-invariant permanent earnings, while (υ
i
0h, υ
i
1t) indicates time-
varying transitory fluctuations. The latter might arise from job mobility, business
cycle effects or variable compensation schemes. If current earnings deviate from
permanent status, using them as a proxy for long-run status introduces attenuation
bias in the estimation of equation (1). Assuming that υi1t and υ
i
0h are uncorrelated
2See Behrman & Taubman (1985) as an example.
3For a further errors-in-reporting problem see Bound & Krueger (1991) and Duncan & Hill (1985).
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with each other and permanent earnings yi0,1, a deviation implies a downward incon-
sistency of the estimated slope coefficient βˆOLSy in an OLS estimation by the factor
θh (Solon 1992).
plim βˆOLSy = θhβy < βy(4)
θh =
(
V ar[y0]
V ar[y0] + V ar[υ0h]
)
(5)
The attenuation factor θh captures how much signal V ar[y0] is provided by the
measure y0h relative to its total noise, V ar[y0h] = V ar[y0] + V ar[υ0h].
Based on single-year snapshots, empirical findings by Corcoran, Laren, Gordon &
Solon (1991), Card (1994) and Hyslop (2001) suggest an attenuation factor around
θh = 0.5. This implies a (considerable) signal-to-noise ratio of observed parental
earnings and an attenuation bias of (1 − θh) = 0.5. Note also, that transitory
fluctuations in offspring‘s earnings υi1t do not bias the OLS estimation in equation
(1) as long as they are uncorrelated with υi0h. However, the higher their variance,
the larger the confidence interval of βˆOLSy will be.
Averaging Parental Earnings
To decrease the magnitude of the inconsistency, Solon (1992) suggests to average
parental status over T years which reduces the variance of the noise relative to the
signal. Transitory shocks are averaged away, as long as the process is stationary, see
Mazumder (2005).
θh =
(
V ar[y0]
V ar[y0] + 1T V ar[υ0h]
)
(6)
As more years of data are used, the attenuation factor θh rises and the attenuation
bias (1 − θh) declines. According to Mazumder (2005), the attenuation factor θh
rises to θh = 0.7 (from θh = 0.5) when relying on a 5-year average of earnings.
The attenuation bias is reduced to [(1 − θh) = 0.3]. Solon (1992) and Wiegand
(1997) estimated an intergenerational elasticity of father’s and son’s earnings based
on 5-year averages of 0.4 for the United States and 0.2 for Germany. Given the
attenuation factor mentioned above the ”true” elasticities would come closer to 0.6
for the United States and 0.3 for Germany.
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Instrumenting Parental Earnings
In a second approach, Solon (1992) assumes that offspring’s permanent earnings yi1
are not solely determined by parental long-run status yi0 as in equation (1), but by
an additional factor Ii0 as well.
yi1 = β1y
i
0 + βII
i
0 + ω
i
1(7)
In this case, the direct projection of offspring’s permanent earnings on parental
long-run status introduces an omitted-variable bias.
yi1 = βyy
i
0 + 
i
1(8)
βy = β1 + βI
(
Cov[I0, y0]
V ar[y0]
)
(9)
An instrumental variable estimation, with Ii0 as the instrument will have the follow-
ing probability limit, Solon (1992).
plim βˆIVy = βy + βI
(
1− κ2
κ
)(
Sd[I0]
Sd[y0]
)
(10)
κ =
Cov[I0, y0]
Sd[y0]Sd[I0]
(11)
βˆIVy is an unbiased estimator for βy only if the instrument does not influence off-
spring’s status (βI = 0) or the instrument and parental status are perfectly corre-
lated, |κ| = 1. The closer |κ| is to one, the smaller the bias as there is less variation
in earnings that is not captured by the instrument. Assuming a positive but imper-
fect correlation between the instrument and parental long-run status, the direction
of the inconsistency is determined by βI . If the instrument Ii0 has a positive impact
on offspring’ s status (βI > 0), the estimator will be biased upward. If the opposite
is true, the estimated coefficient is downward biased like the OLS estimate.
In empirical research, parental years of education (Solon 1992, Dearden, Machin &
Reed 1997) or indicators of occupational prestige (Zimmerman 1992, Wiegand 1997)
have been used to instrument long-run parental status. Since years of education
enhance labor market earnings, it may capture an important part of parental per-
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manent earnings, although not necessarily to a 100%4. In this case an IV estimate
using years of education will be upward biased.
Estimating the intergenerational elasticity βˆy using OLS and IV techniques there-
fore suggests to bracket the coefficient (Solon 1992). The OLS estimate is downward
inconsistent due to error-in-variable bias, whereas the IV estimate is presumably up-
ward biased. Accounting for the associated standard errors, βy is located between
the two estimates.
βˆOLSy < βy < βˆ
IV
y
2.1.2. Lifecycle Variations
Empirical research as well as theoretical reasoning suggest that wage workers differ
with respect to their age-earnings profiles5. This may occur due to age-specific het-
erogeneity in human capital investment or variations in the wage structure across
jobs erected by firms for the purpose of effort regulation and incentive compatibility.
For estimation purposes, the projection of current on permanent earnings is gener-
alized to include a time-varying parameter λt,h to capture age-specific aspects in
the association between current and permanent earnings over the lifecycle (Haider
& Solon 2006).
yi1t = λty
i
1 + υ
i
1t(12)
yi0h = λhy
i
0 + υ
i
0h(13)
Averaging parental earnings yi0h across T years, the interaction of both types of mea-
surement error is considered. If parental and offspring’s long-run status is proxied
by short-run earnings, equation 14 determines the potential bias.
plim βˆOLSy = λtθhβy(14)
θh =
λhV ar[y0]
λ2hV ar[y0] +
1
T V ar[υ0h]
(15)
4See Card (1999) for a recent survey.
5See Mincer (1975) and Baker (1997) among others and Vogel (2007) for an application to inter-
generational mobility.
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Figure 1: Estimated Correlation Between Current and Permanent Earnings
Assuming θh = 1, the probability limit of the estimated coefficient βˆOLSy is λtβy
instead of βy. In the case of λt = 1 (as implicitly assumed in the discussion of
transitory fluctuations) this does no harm, but in general, the estimator will be
inconsistent and the inconsistency varies as a function of age t at which earnings
are observed. Focusing on the impact of θh (setting λt = 1), it is not obvious
whether the combination of transitory fluctuations and lifecycle variation leads to
an amplification bias instead of an attenuation bias. For λh > 1 the estimation is
downward biased, but for values smaller than one and minor transitory variance the
opposite is true. θh is a summary measure of the attenuation bias resulting from
transitory fluctuations as well as lifecycle variation. Therefore the age-composition
of the sample matters (Jenkins 1987, Grawe 2006). In summary, measurement error
in offspring’s status is not innocuous for consistency as well as measurement error
in parental long-runs status. Both induce either amplification or attenuation bias of
the OLS estimation.
Using U.S. Social Security Administration earnings histories of members of the
Health and Retirement Study sample, Haider & Solon (2006) asses the magnitude of
measurement error in offspring’s and parental permanent earnings separately. Their
dataset ranges from 1951 to 1991 and provides nearly career-long earnings histories
7
Figure 2: Estimated Reliability Ratio
for a broadly representative sample of the U.S. population. This allows to derive a
more precise estimate of the (logarithmized) present value of lifetime earnings lnV i.
Starting with the impact of measurement error in offspring’s (permanent) earnings
level, the forward regression of lnV i on yit,h leads to the estimated slope coefficient
λˆt,h depicted in figure 1. Starting at a value around λˆt,h = 0.2 it increases steadily.
At age 32, the textbook assumption of λt,h = 1 seems reasonable. Thenceforward,
λˆt,h declines some in the late forties. Turning to the case of measurement error in
parental permanent earnings, the estimated reliability ratio θˆh is depicted in figure
2. It is the result of a backward regression of lnV i on a 5-year average of yit,h. A
significant increase till age 30 is followed by a quite robust factor between 0.6 and
0.8, but after the age of 50, θˆh declines and the bias rises. Unfortunately, we are not
aware of any comparable work for the case of Germany.
2.2. Sample Homogeneity
In selected sub-populations with respect to location, socioeconomic status or oc-
cupation, the sample variance in long-run economic status is possibly less than
in the whole population. For example, a study by Sewell & Hauser (1975) was
based on a selective son-sample from Wisconsin, who graduated in 1957 and thus
8
excluded high-school dropouts, leaving only rather successful sons in the sample.
Similarly, Behrman & Taubman (1985) are confined to parental data on white male
twins born between 1927 and 1929, who both served in the Army. Presumably,
this father-sample is rather homogeneous. Both types of selectivity may introduce
a third source of inconsistency as Solon (1989) points out. To concentrate on the
effect of sample homogeneity, long-run status is assumed to be measured correctly
until indicated otherwise. Formally speaking, the parental/offspring-sample is more
homogeneous in long-run status, if the variance in permanent earnings V ar[y∗j=0,1]
is only a fraction τ of the population variance V ar[yj=0,1].
V ar[y∗j=0,1] = τV ar[yj=0,1](16)
Under normality of parental economic status, selection on the dependent variable
leads to a proportional change in the estimated intergenerational elasticity, where
R2 is the coefficient of determination of the population-based regression model
(Goldberger 1981).
plim βˆOLSy∗ = φβy < βy(17)
φ =
τ
1−R2(1− τ)(18)
If τ < 1 (implying φ < 1) the estimated intergenerational elasticity βˆOLSy∗ is down-
ward inconsistent even though long-run status is measured correctly.
A sample exhibiting homogeneity in parental earnings does not affect the con-
sistency of intergenerational elasticity estimates. This is true as long as economic
status is measured correctly. If this is not the case, the downward bias is worsened
(Solon 1992, Wiegand 1997), see equation (19).(
V ar[y0∗]
V ar[y0∗] + V ar[υ0h]
)
βy = plim βˆOLSy∗ <
plim βˆOLSy =
(
V ar[y0]
V ar[y0] + V ar[υ0h]
)
βy
(19)
In applied empirical research, inclusion into an intergenerational dataset requires
for father and son to both report positive labor market earnings in the periods of
interest. Presumably, in such samples βy is underestimated, but the use of larger
representative samples eases this problem. To the best of our knowledge, however,
there is no research on the magnitude of this bias available.
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3. Econometric Approach and Sampling Procedure
We estimate the following econometric model presented in equation (20). Son’s
observed status yi1t in year t is expressed as a regression function of father’s observed
status yi0h in year h, including age-controls for both (Solon 1992, Zimmerman 1992,
Wiegand 1997, Vogel 2007). It is derived by the incorporation of age-earnings profiles
into equations (2) and (3) and substitution into the basic equation (1).
yi1t = β0 + βyy
i
0h + β1A
i
0h + β2A
2i
0h + β3A
i
1t + β4A
2i
1t + ω
i
1t(20)
An individual‘s current earnings are determined by the level of permanent earnings
(yi1, y
i
0) the stage in the lifecycle [(A
i
t;A
2i
t ), (A
i
h;A
2i
h )], a general level of economic
well-being in the corresponding generation (α1, α0), and an idiosyncratic error term
(υi1t, υ
i
0h).
yi1t = y
i
1 + α1 + γ1 A
i
1t + δ1 A
2i
1t + υ
i
1t(21)
yi0h = y
i
0 + α0 + γ0 A
i
0h + δ0 A
2i
0h + υ
i
0h(22)
The empirical part builds on samples form the German Socio-Economic Panel6
(SOEP) from 1984 to 2006. To assure comparability of real earnings observed in
different years, they are adjusted by the real GDP-Growth Rate. Our measure of
long-run economic status are real7 monthly earnings before tax and social security
deductions as reported in each cross-section of the SOEP8. This allows for interna-
tional comparison9. Measuring all earnings variables in their natural logarithm, we
choose the intergenerational earnings elasticity as our indicator for intergenerational
mobility and use both terms interchangeably. Thus, our indicator is a summary
measure of personal characteristics shared by parent and offspring that are valued
6Consult Haisken-DeNew & Frick (2005) for further information on the dataset.
7Deflated by the consumer price index (base year 2000) supplied by the German Federal Statistical
Office.
8This approach is similar to Wiegand (1997), but different from Vogel (2007), who calculates a
measure of yearly earnings from monthly earnings records.
9See Solon (1999) for a survey on intergenerational earnings mobility. We concentrate on persis-
tence of labor market earnings. For research using a more inclusive measure of total economic
status made up by a variety of differing types of income, earnings and monetary inheritance see
Piketty (2000) and Mulligan (1997) among others. It is left for future research to construct a more
inclusive measure with the SOEP, since sample size is reduced and the problem of measurement
error increases.
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in the German labor market. This includes similarities in educational attainment
and cognitive performance, but also noncognitive skills and personal traits seem to
play an important role as well (Bowles, Gintis & Osborne-Groves 2001, Bowles &
Gintis 2002).
Table 1: Final Sample Overview
Groups Excluded from Sample Measures of Economic Status Age - Restrictions
self-employed Son
part-time employed monthly earnings (1984 - 2006) between 30 - 50
East Germans Father
migrants monthly earnings (1984 - 2006)
younger brothers years of education
A novel feature of our study is the sampling procedure. We select pairs of fathers
and sons in a way that their earnings are observed as close in their lifecycle as pos-
sible. Furthermore, the bias due to transitory fluctuations and lifecycle variation is
minimized, see table 1. As a start, the self-employed, who have more volatile earnings
(Baker & Solon 2003, Albarra´n, Carrasco & Mart´ınez-Granado 2007, Pfeiffer 1994)
are excluded. Only full-time employed are retained in the sample, that is indi-
viduals reporting to work more than 35 hours the last week. Workers from East
Germany are excluded as well since the possibility for mobility increased dramati-
cally after the fall of the Berlin Wall and drastic wage growth10 may have changed
the reliability of current earnings to reflect permanent status. Migrants are dropped
from the analysis for two reasons. First, migration might change the long-run rela-
tionship between labor market earnings of father and son, and, second, the transi-
tory component is presumably relatively high which increases the attenuation bias
(Borjas 2006, Friedberg 2000). To avoid sample homogeneity, only the oldest sib-
ling is included in our baseline specification (Solon 1992). For the group of fathers,
moving 5-year averages of earnings and age are calculated to reduce the attenuation
bias. Thus, if for a given observation earnings are not observable in each of the four
following years, it is dropped.
Furthermore, the following age restrictions are imposed (and relaxed again for
further discussion) to account for the time-varying association between short- and
10See Hunt (2002) among others.
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long-run economic status. This procedure accounts for the pattern of the variance of
the transitory component over the lifecycle (which flattens out at mid age in the U.S.
(Baker & Solon 2003)). Since the association between monthly and lifetime earnings
is still low for workers below the age of 30, we select workers above that age. For
younger workers job mobility is high and earnings are more volatile, partly because of
lower tenure (Haider & Solon 2006, Bjo¨rklund 1993). Workers aged above 50 years
are excluded as well. Labor market status and hours worked may become more
volatile again which might depress the estimated level of persistence (Grawe 2006).
However, this line of reasoning may differ between countries, for instance as a result
of different industrial structures or different degrees of employment protection laws
(Blau & Kahn 1996, OECD 1999, Pries & Rogerson 2005).
Sonn Fathern
obs.i  
 
 
@
@
@R
obs.k
obs.l
obs.j  
 
 
@
@
@R
obs.k
obs.l
Figure 3: Sampling Strategy
Finally, father (obsk and obsl) and son (obsj and obsi) observations (of family n)
satisfying the sampling rule are matched in all possible combinations, see figure 3.
This procedure leads to numerous matched observations for each father-son pair.
To identify a unique pair, intended to lead to the most reliable estimate of the
intergenerational elasticity, a decision rule is implemented. For each observation we
select the one with the smallest absolute age-difference between father and son. This
is to ensure that father and son are observed at as similar stages in their lifecycle as
possible. If still more than one observation for a particular father-son pair fulfills the
requirement, the one associated with the lowest father age is used. For comparison
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and discussion, other samples with less restrictive selection rules are utilized in the
next section.
The sample contains 180 father-son pairs compared to Wiegand’s (1997) 130 and
Vogel’s (2007) 300. Table 2 depicts the basic statistics. The age-difference between
father and son amounts to 8.68 years. Sons in the sample report less earnings than
their matched fathers which is mainly explained by their early stage in the lifecycle.
While most information on father’s economic status is obtained within the early
SOEP waves, the collection of offsprings’ information is not confined to the most
recent wave. The age-composition of our sample differs substantially from previous
works. Sons are 35 years old which is an increase of 4 years compared to Wiegand
(1997) and 13 years compared to Couch & Dunn (1997). Solon (1992) reports an
average age of 29 for sons, while Bjo¨rklund & Ja¨ntti (1997) rely on sons at the
age of 34 on average. An average age of 44 years for fathers is slightly lower than
the one reported by Wiegand (1997) with 46 years, while Couch & Dunn’s (1997)
fathers are 51 years old. Solon’s (1992) fathers are reported to be 42 years of age on
average, nearly identical to an average father in Bjo¨rklund & Ja¨ntti’s (1997) sample
(43 years).
Table 2: Final Sample Statistics
Statistic Fathers Sons
Gross Earnings in €1 2,307.03 1,936.87
Sd. of Gross Earnings 716.82 640.40
Year of Observation 1,987 2,004
Age in Years 44.40 35.73
Age - Difference in Years 8.68
Number of Observations 180
1 reported 5/1 - year average of adjusted real
gross monthly earnings
Selection could rise from the blind eye on individuals not meeting the selection
rules, table 2. The final sample is compared to all workers living up to the sample
requirements except for the need to report positive earnings 5 years in a row and be-
ing matched with their offspring. The father-sample is contrasted in 1984, while the
son-sample is compared in 2004. Earnings in the father-sample are nearly identical
to the one reported by all workers in 1984 (2,331.01€). However, the standard devi-
ation is higher in the comparison group (782.43€) in 1984. Using 5-year averages of
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earnings in the father-sample, therefore, as intended, reduces transitory fluctuations.
Comparing the son-sample, earnings are higher (1,917.13€in the comparison group)
and show a higher standard deviation (574.15€). In our son-sample the average age
is lower which induces higher wage dispersion.
4. Econometric Findings
4.1. Basic Results
Table 3: Basic Results
5 - Year Avg. Earnings Single - Year Earnings
OLS - Estimate
Intergenerational Elasticity 0.282 0.205
95% Confidence Interval (0.09 - 0.44) (0.08 - 0.32)
Standard Error 0.087 0.061
Observations 180 249
IV - Estimate1
Intergenerational Elasticity 0.374
95% Confidence Interval (0.09 - 0.65)
Standard Error 0.144
Observations 180
1 using years of education
The OLS estimate based on a 5-year average of earnings βˆOLSy = 0.282 is higher
compared to Wiegand (1997), whereas the one-year snapshot is about the same, ta-
ble 3. Compared to Vogel (2007), the result based on the 5-year average of earnings
is similar. We use years of education11 as an instrument to bracket the intergen-
erational elasticity. According to the IV estimate the intergenerational elasticity
is higher, βˆIVy = 0.374. Following Solon’s (1992) approach, the intergenerational
11This variable includes both, school and occupational education. The German school system intro-
duces differentiated educational tracks after four grades of primary education. The basic school
(Hauptschule) graduates individuals after five years of secondary education and is traditionally a
preparation for blue collar occupations. The middle school (Realschule) lasts six years and trains
for white collar employment. The highest track (Gymnasium) offers nine years of schooling and
a degree (Abitur), which is a precondition for academic studies. Completion of an apprenticeship
adds another 1.5 years, a technical college 3 years, and graduation form university increases years
of education by 5 years.
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elasticity of German Workers should lie between the two estimates and we suggest
a reasonable value of 13 .
βˆOLSy = 0.282 < βy < 0.374 = βˆ
IV
y
The 95% confidence interval of the IV estimate [0.09 ≤ βˆIVy ≤ 0.66] includes the
OLS estimate. Although the two point estimates contain some useful information,
the degree of precision seems to be rather low. We come back to this issue in the
conclusion.
4.2. Investigating the Bias from Transitory Fluctuations
Table 4: Summary Results1: Balanced Panel
Father Measure2 5 - Year 4 - Year 3 - Year 2 - Year 1 - Year
Intergenerational Elasticity 0.2822∗∗∗ 0.2841∗∗∗ 0.2751∗∗∗ 0.2441∗∗∗ 0.1984∗∗
95% Confidence Interval (0.09 - 0.44) (0.11 - 0.45) (0.11 - 0.44) (0.08 - 0.41) (0.04 - 0.35)
Standard Error 0.0870 0.0866 0.0854 0.0841 0.0798
Observations 180 180 180 180 180
Basic Specification
Source: own calculations
Level of Significance: *** 1% **5% *10%
1 see Table 10 in the Appendix for the detailed results
2 average of father’s logarithmized adjusted real gross monthly earnings
Table 4 and 5 report the general pattern that βˆOLSy increases with the number
of years averaged as the attenuation bias declines. This is in line with equation
(6). For inclusion in the balanced panel, father earnings need to be observed for
5 years in a row even though only lower averages are used for the supplementary
estimations. The changing estimate is due to the reduced number of years averaged
and not to a change in the sample composition. For this reason, the number of
observations remains constant. The unbalanced panel, however, includes all pairs
with the necessary number of successive earnings observations for the father that
is needed for the respective estimation. A comparison of the OLS results in the
balanced and unbalanced panel reveals that the difference between a 5- and 4-year
15
average of father’s earnings is negligible. However, it makes a difference in our
sample whether the estimate is based on a 1/2-year average compared to an 4/5-
year average. Averaging only a small number of years amplifies the attenuation bias
due to a high volatility of the earnings measure utilized. This result is in line with
the literature as reported in section 2.
Table 5: Summary Results1: Unbalanced Panel
Father Measure2 5 - Year 4 - Year 3 - Year 2 - Year 1 - Year
Intergenerational Elasticity 0.2822∗∗∗ 0.2867∗∗∗ 0.2596∗∗∗ 0.2076∗∗∗ 0.2045∗∗∗
95% Confidence Interval (0.11 - 0.45) (0.13 - 0.45) (0.10 - 0.41) (0.07 - 0.34) (0.08 - 0.32)
Standard Error 0.0870 0.0815 0.0790 0.0695 0.0614
Observations 180 190 217 227 249
Basic Specification
Source: own calculations
Level of Significance: *** 1% **5% *10%
1 see Table 11 in the Appendix for the detailed results
2 average of father’s logarithmized adjusted real gross monthly earnings
The rather early decrease of the estimated coefficient in the unbalanced panel might
be attributable to the construction of the panel. When lowering the number of years
averaged, the added individuals do not report earnings in the following year likely
due to un- or part-time employment. This implies that father-son pairs with larger
transitory fluctuations are consecutively added to the panel.
4.3. Investigating the Bias from Lifecycle Variation
Raising the upper age-limit from 50 to 55 years results in a rather sharp increase in
sample size and a slight decrease in estimated intergenerational persistence. How-
ever, table 6 reveals an increase in the estimate when continuing to soften the age
restriction. This seems to be in line with Vogel (2007), whose estimate of intergener-
ational persistence in Germany based including individuals aged above 50 is slightly
higher. We offer 2 explanations. First, the increase could point at sample selection
with only pairs added that exhibit a particular strong persistence of earnings. But
a comparison of the descriptive statistics (years of education, monthly earnings) did
not offer any evidence on the type of selection. Second, the increase in the estimated
level of mobility could be explained by an increase in the reliability ratio θh in our
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sample rather than a decrease as documented for the United States, figure 2. This is
presumably the result of the comparatively high degree of centralization governing
wage determination in Germany and employment protection laws which, together
with the accumulation of specific human capital, favor incumbent workers12. This
could decrease the transitory fluctuations among older German workers.
Table 6: Summary Results1: Relaxing Age - Restrictions for Fathers
Father’s Maximal Age 50 55 60 65
Intergenerational Elasticity2 0.2822∗∗∗ 0.2509∗∗∗ 0.3538∗∗∗ 0.3584∗∗∗
95% Confidence Interval (0.11 - 0.45) (0.10 - 0.41) (0.22 - 0.49) (0.22 - 0.49)
Standard Error 0.0870 0.0794 0.0696 0.0686
Observations 180 240 281 285
Basic Specification
Source: own calculations
Level of Significance: *** 1% **5% *10%
1 see Table 13 in the Appendix for the detailed results
2 5-year average of father’s logarithmized adjusted real gross monthly earnings; son at least
30 years of age
Table 7 documents a significant rise in the number of observations and a sharp
decline in the estimated intergenerational elasticity when the age requirement for
sons is consecutively lowered to 20 years. This seems to be in line with Haider &
Solon (2006). The parameter λt (see equation (14) in section 2) is lowered as younger
and younger workers are added to the sample and the lifecycle bias rises.
12See Botero, Djankov, Porta & Lopez-De-Silanes (2004) and Franz & Pfeiffer (2006) among others.
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Table 7: Summary Results1: Relaxing Age - Restrictions for Sons
Son’s Minimum Age 30 25 20
Intergenerational Elasticity2 0.2822∗∗∗ 0.2553∗∗∗ 0.2402∗∗∗
95% Confidence Interval (0.11 - 0.45) (0.12 - 0.39) (0.13 - 0.30)
Standard Error 0.0870 0.0666 0.0558
Observations 180 282 385
Basic Specification
Source: own calculations
Level of Significance: *** 1% **5% *10%
1 see Table 14 in the Appendix for the detailed results
2 5-year average of father’s logarithmized adjusted real gross monthly earn-
ings; father at most 50 years of age
The analysis above gave the impression that the age-composition of either sample
is changed without affecting the other. Obviously, this is not true since father-
son pairs are added. However, negligible changes in the age composition of the
unchanged (with respect to the age restrictions imposed) sample support this ap-
proach.
4.4. Further Sensitivity Checks
Including Younger Siblings
The inclusion of younger siblings raises the sample size from 180 to 224 when relying
on a 5-year average of father’s earnings. The point estimate is slightly reduced to
βˆOLSy = 0.276. Siblings share the same family and community background which
makes similar long-run economic status more likely and increases homogeneity within
the sample. This depresses the estimated coefficient slightly, see table 15 in the
Appendix for the detailed results.
Adjustment of Monthly Earnings
To ensure robustness with respect to the measure of comparability (GDP-Growth
in the baseline estimation), earnings are deflated by the growth rate of average real
gross monthly earnings in Germany’s industry sector (as reported by the German
18
Federal Statistical Office). The estimated intergenerational elasticity is not affected,
see table 16 in the Appendix for the detailed results.
Instrumenting Parental Status
To compare our findings with Wiegand (1997), the IV estimation is repeated instru-
menting parental status using the Wegener-Index, a standard index for occupational
prestige. The baseline estimate (βˆIVy = 0.372) remains unchanged. The finding that
both instruments lead to rather identical results is robust to changes in the sampling
rule, see table 17 in the Appendix for the detailed results.
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Figure 8 compares our result to the international evidence. Although the studies
differ with respect to data and methods, the comparison suggests higher mobility
(that is less persistence) in Germany compared to the United States and the United
Kingdom, but lower mobility compared to Sweden. Our preferred point estimate of
the elasticity in Germany is βGERy =
1
3 , compared with β
US
y = 0.4 for the United
States and βSy = 0.2 for Sweden. In comparison to former studies by Couch &
Dunn (1997) and Wiegand (1997) on intergenerational persistence in Germany, Vogel
(2007) and our results suggest higher persistence. This is the result of our special
attention on the sources of potential lifecycle bias. However, common to all studies
presented in table 8 are the considerable confidence intervals, which currently forbid
any strong comparative statements on the level of intergenerational persistence.
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Table 8: International Perspective
Country OLS Result IV Result
United States
Mazumder (2005) 0.613 (0.09)a —
Solon (1992) 0.413 (0.09) 0.526 (0.14)
Zimmerman (1992) 0.400 (0.06) 0.330 (0.27)
United Kingdom
Dearden, Machin & Reed (1997) 0.240 (0.03) 0.443 (0.03)
Sweden
Bjo¨rklund & Ja¨ntti (1997) 0.216 (0.04) —
Germany
Couch & Dunn (1997) 0.124 (0.07) —
Wiegand (1997) 0.238 (0.06) 0.402 (0.13)
Vogel (2007) 0.266 (0.06) —
this volume 0.282 (0.09) 0.374 (0.14)
a Standard errors in parentheses.
For illustrative reasons, we conclude by figuring out some consequences of the
value of βGERy =
1
3 for Germany. The intergenerational elasticity βy translates
intragenerational inequality in parental long-run labor market status into the eco-
nomic advantage, which a child from parents with higher economic status can hope
for compared to one from lower status parents. Table 9 depicts the advantage of a
child with parents in the top permanent earnings decile compared to offspring born
to parents in the bottom decile as determined by equation (23) (Corak 2004).
y90th1
y10th1
=
(
y90th0
y10th0
)βy
(23)
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Table 9: Inequality and the Expected Perma-
nent Earnings Advantage
Intergenerational Elasticity
90/10 - Ratio 0.2 13 0.4 0.5
2.0 15% 25% 32% 41%
2.5 20% 35% 44% 58%
3.0 25% 44% 55% 73%
3.5 28% 51% 65% 87%
4.0 32% 59% 74% 100%
For Germany, Gernandt & Pfeiffer (2007) calculate a 90/10-percentile earnings ratio
of 2.5 for a cross-section sample of prime age dependent male workers in 2005, which
is rather close to our one. Then, taking our advocated value for an intergenerational
elasticity in Germany of βGERy =
1
3 , the expected earnings advantage amounts to
35%. If βGERy would be 0.5, the advantage increases to 59%.
Summarizing our findings, we find intergenerational earnings persistence among
West German workers is higher than previously suggested. A value of βGERy =
1
3
still indicates that there is substantial intergenerational mobility, which presumably
is one result of the massive expansion of publicly funded education in Germany from
the seventies.
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